

## Lecture 2

# Wind Forces and Damage to Buildings and Structures

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# Damage due to Typhoons

## Typhoon Damage to Soccer Stadium in Cheju Island, Korea August 30, 2002



## Damage to Power Transmission Towers

Typhoon No.21, October 1, 2002



## Damage in Miyakojima due to Typhoon No.14 (Maemi), September 11, 2003



## Damage in Miyakojima due to Typhoon No.14 (Maemi), September 11, 2003



Damage to a roof of a gymnasium

10-03

**Damage due to Typhoon No. 14 (Maemi)  
in Miyakojima Island, September 11, 2003**



**Damage due to Typhoon No. 14 (Maemi)  
in Busan, Korea, September 12, 2003**



## Damage due to Typhoon No. 14 (Maemi) in Busan, Korea, September 12, 2003



## Wind-born debris



TYPHOON 0314, 2003

## Wind-born debris




TYPHOON 0314, 2003

## Typhoon Maemi (No.14, 2003)

- **Miyakojima Island Meteorological Station  
(Okinawa Pref., Japan)**
  - Maximum Mean Wind Speed : 34.8m/s
  - Maximum Peak Gust : 74.1m/s  
(10<sup>th</sup> highest in Japan)
  - Lowest Pressure : 912 hPa  
(8<sup>th</sup> lowest in Japan)
- **Miyakojima Self-Defense Force**
  - Maximum Peak Gust : 87m/s

## Fluctuating roof pressures




## Damage to trees



TYPHOON 7513, 1975

## Most Likely Locations of Damage



## Damage to roof tiles



TYPHOON 7513, 1975



## Damage to a folded steel roof



TYPHOON 7513, 1975

## Damage to a folded steel roof



TYPHOON 7905, 1979

## Wind-born debris




TYPHOON 7513, 1975

## Blown-off of roofs




TYPHOON 7513, 1975

# Damage Correlation



by Yasushi Uematsu, 1992

# Chain of Damage



## Wind-born debris



TYPHOON 9119, 1991

## Wind-born debris



Steel roof sheet flew from upstream (Typhoon 7513)

## Damage to a wooden house



TYPHOON 7513, 1975

## Damage to cladding



TYPHOON 7513, 1975

## Damage to steel shutters



TYPHOON 9119, 1991

## Damage to truss towers



TYPHOON 7905, 1975

## Damage to a power transmission tower



TYPHOON 1991 (Courtesy of J. Maeda)

## Damage to a power transmission tower



TYPHOON 9119, 1991 (by courtesy of J. Maeda)

## Inclination of steel reinforcing bars



TYPHOON 7905, 1979

## Damage to a wooden telegraph pole



TYPHOON 7513, 1975



## Damage to a RC telegraph pole



TYPHOON 7513, 1975

## Falling down of gravestones



TYPHOON 7513, 1975

## Falling down of gravestones



TYPHOON 7513, 1975

## Falling Down of Gravestones

TYPHOON 7513, 1975

$B$ (cm)	$D$ (cm)	$H$ (cm)	$\rho$ (kg/m <sup>3</sup> )	$V_{cr}$ (m/s)	Falling Down
24.5	24.5	90.0	3370	54.7	Yes
24.5	24.5	64.0	2420	55.0	Yes
26.0	26.0	70.0	2420	56.0	Yes
16.0	22.3	48.0	2420	57.8	No
16.0	21.5	53.0	2420	53.1	Yes
24.2	24.2	57.0	2420	57.5	No
38.5	38.5	104.0	2690	71.5	No
25.5	18.0	62.5	2420	40.9	Yes
26.0	25.0	69.5	2420	53.9	Yes
30.0	28.5	74.5	2420	59.3	No

## Damage to a steel building of under-construction




by courtesy of Junji Maeda

## World Natural Disasters and Insurance Paid (as of 1999)

		USD
<b>1992 Hurricane Andrew</b>	14	Billion
<b>1994 Northridge Earthquake</b>	9	Billion
<b>1991 Typhoon 9119</b>	5	Billion
<b>1990 Storm Dahlia</b>	4	Billion
<b>1989 Hurricane Hugo</b>	3.5	Billion

## Rate of Causes of Property Insurance Money




Jack Cermak, 1996

## Strong Typhoons in Japan


Typhoon	Fatalities	Damaged Buildings*
Muroto 1934	3,036	92,740
Suonada 1942	1,158	102,374
Makurazaki 1945	3,756	89,839
Catherine 1947	1,930	9,298
Toyamaru 1954	1,761	207,542
Kanogawa 1958	1,269	16,743
Isewan 1959	5,098	833,965
<b>T9119 1991</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>14,538</b>

\* Damaged Buildings include severely damaged buildings only, defined as those of which more than 50% of the main frames collapsed.

## Rate of Completely Destroyed Houses vs. Maximum Peak Gust



## Number of Casualties due to Typhoons



Number of casualties due to 114 typhoons in 40 years, 1951-1990 (Fukumasa, 1992)

# Damage due to Tornadoes and Downbursts

## Tornado Damage in South Africa



Courtesy of Adam Goliger

## Devastation of Cape Town; 1999



Courtesy of Adam Goliger

## Tornado in Kumagaya August 8, 2003



10-06

## Recent reduction of wind damage

### Causes

- Improvement of structural performance
- Improvement in accuracy of weather forecasting and hurricane information (Meteorological Satellites, Computers)
- Development of communication tools (TV, Internet)      Reduction of casualties
- Development of disaster prevention systems
- Improvement of infrastructure
- Development of wind resistant design

## Reasons why windstorms were most feared in the past

### Windstorms

- Diameter : up to 1,000km
- Frequently occurs  
(Energy is discharged every year.)
- Lack of Prediction / Communication

### Methods

Attacks without caution      Casualties

### Earthquakes

- Local
- Not Frequent  
(Energy is discharged every hundreds years.)



## Wind Damage

- **85% of economic loss by natural disasters in the world is due to wind damage.**
- **An underestimate of economic loss due to wind**
  - Improvement in accuracy of weather forecasting and hurricane information (Meteorological Satellites)
  - Development of communication tools (TV, Internet)    Reduction of casualties
  - Development of disaster prevention systems
  - Improvement of infrastructure

**Reduction of casualties**

## Wind Forces

- **Pressure acting on surfaces**

Heavy weight and stiff buildings have an advantage.

Light weight and flexible high-rise buildings **are vulnerable to wind**

## Wind Forces

- Buildings should be designed to be heavy weight and stiff.

### Three Piglets

- Eldest piglet :  
    **Straw House**      × *Worst !*
- Middle piglet :  
    **Wooden House**
- Youngest piglet :  
    **Brick House**      *Good !*

## Wind-induced Phenomena

$U=10 \sim 15\text{m/s}$  (10min mean,  $15\text{m/s}$ : 1-year recurrence in Tokyo)

- Damage to umbrellas
- Vibration perception in flexible high-rise buildings

$U=20\text{m/s}$

- Seasick and uneasiness in high-rise buildings
- Damage to garage shutters    · Falling down of pedestrians

$U=25\text{m/s}$

- Damage to roof tiles
- Damage to window panes due to wind-born debris

$U=30\text{m/s}$

- Collapse of RC block fences    · Damage to steel sheet roofing
- Collapse to wooden houses    · Falling down of gravestones

$U=35\text{m/s}$  (50-year recurrence in Tokyo)

- Damage to window panes due to wind pressure

$U=40\text{m/s}$  (200-year recurrence in Tokyo)

- Damage to cladding of high-rise buildings

$U=45\text{m/s}$  (600-year recurrence in Tokyo)

- Main frame stresses in high-rise buildings exceed elastic limit

(Peak Gust is 1.5 ~ 2 times  $U$ )

## Wind Forces

### Points of Wind Resistant Design

- Local Negative Pressures
- Roofs
- Openings such as Windows
- Wind Debris            Shutters

### Importance of Wind Resistant Design

#### Wind Load Predominant Structures & Parts

- Window Panes, Claddings
- Membrane Structures
- High-rise Buildings ( $H > 200\text{m}$  in Japan)
- Long-span Bridges
- Tall Chimneys, Steel Towers etc.

#### Wind Load Important Structures

- Wooden Houses
- Factory Buildings, Warehouses
- Gymnasium, Baseball Domes
- Long-span Exhibition Halls

# Falsehood and Truth in Safety

## What is Safety ?

■ **“Safety” is a “risky” term.**

• **“Safety” has a totalitarian and emotional sound.**

**“ It is sufficiently safe to take a specified necessary sectional area. However, as the section has three times the necessary area, it is safe three times. ”**

**Three times infinity ?**

**Absoluteness is shown faintly.**

**Intention of misleading: SAFETY ZONE ???**

## Safety in the Law

- **Building Standard Law in Japan**

**Safety** : no collapse, no loss of life

- **Legally Necessary Procedures**

Legal Preparation of Design Documents

- **Safety in Social Procedure**

≠ True Safety

Intentional Misapprehension

## Less Improvement of Structural Performance

- **Merit of a higher grade of structural performance**

**rarely experienced in the life time of an individual building** (events of decades or hundreds of years of recurrence )

**A group of buildings consisting of a city is sustained for a long period beyond an individual building's life time.**

National security, Urban building group

*cf.* Two times the design seismic force requires an increase of only several % in the total construction cost.

## **Improvement of Equipment Performance**

- **Merit of a higher grade performance of service equipment**  
(Air-conditioners , Lights , Elevators, etc. )

**can be experienced immediately after setting up**

**Significant increase in equipment costs in these decades**

## **An Accident at Amaru-valley Railroad Bridge (December 28, 1986)**

- **An out-of-service seven-car train fell from a bridge due to strong wind.**
- **Six persons were killed.**
- **Regulations specify the lowest limit wind speed as 25m/s for passing Amarube bridge.**
- **The alarm device was sounded at that time.**
- **The criminal liability of the person in charge at the site was confirmed.**

**However . . .**

- **This limit wind speed had not been followed, and there had been no accident.**

## An Accident at Amarube-valley Railroad Bridge (December 28, 1986)

■ **If he had stopped the train,** ignoring the precedent, the result would have been:

- Confusion of train time schedule
- Complaints from passengers
- Economic loss / Compensation for delay

Storm of criticisms from the public and his superior or colleagues

He could even have been fired.

### ➤ **Dilemma**

The fact that “A tragic accident will occur, if he does not stop the train ” can never be proved.

⇒ It should not be finished only by the responsibility of the person in charge.

## Lesson from the Amarube-valley Accident

### ■ **Too Conservative Service Regulations**

- Regulation maker's excuse
- Persons in charge at the site can not maintain it for too frequent events.

### ■ **Realistic and Reasonable Provisions**

- The specified limit wind speed and its frequency
- Physical reason for the limit wind speed and the probability of accident
- Social / Economic loss due to stopping the train

### ■ **Discussion based on Scientific Data**

## Human Activities

### - doing one's best

- Limited Cost
- Limited Manpower
- Limited Time
- Limited Knowledge

- There is nothing absolutely safe.
- Everything is accompanied by a risk.

## Life and Safety

### ■ Mixed discussions of Safety and Life

- should be made carefully.

### ■ Life (+ Society)

- Eccentric emotionally-charged arguments dominate the discussions.
- "Life" is used as a trump or all-powerful.
- "Life" is always far superior to all scientific arguments

**Tears, Apologies, Kneel Down, etc.**



## What is Life ?

### Fatalities due to Accidents and Disasters (1969, USA)

Car Accidents	55,790	Air-plane	1,780
Down Fall	17,830	Falling Obstacles	1,270
Fire	7,450	Electric Shock	1,150
Drowning	6,180	Train	880
Toxic	4,520	Lightning	160
Gunfire	2,310	Tornado	90
Machine	2,050	Hurricane	90
Ship	1,740	etc.	8,700
			<b>Total 112,000</b>

## What is Life ?

### ■ Car Accidents :

**10,000 people are killed every year in Japan.**

= 20 jumbo jet airplane crashes

= A jumbo jet crashing every two weeks.

Survivors can enjoy daily convenience **at the sacrifice of 10,000 lives every year.**

## Lies and Truth in Safety

### Nuclear Power Plants

#### • Opponents / Media

- treat it as the most dangerous devil
- never forgive any trivial accidents

#### • Promotors

- emphasize spurious safety
- keep all trivial accidents from sight

## Industrial Accidents

**Fatality**: Injured : Uninjured

= 1 : 30 : 300

A serious accident results from  
a chain of trivial accidents

Only way to reduce a serious  
accident is to eliminate all trivial  
accidents

## Disaster Prevention

- **Qualitative and quantitative estimation of social merits**
- **Scenario of possible accidents**
- **Risk of accidents / disasters**
- **Countermeasure for disaster prevention**
- **Ripple effects of accidents / disasters**
- **Acceptable or not for the society**
- **Comparisons with alternative methods**
- **Discussions based on reliable scientific data**
- **Creation of social environment for frank open discussions**     **Society gazing at Risk**

## Disaster Prevention Staring Fixedly at Risk

- **If we can never crash or collapse,**
  - jumbo jet passenger planes
  - cars
  - high-rise buildings, etc.  
can not be available.
- **Nothing can be made absolutely safe.**  
We have to discuss disaster prevention facing **Risk**.

## Disaster Prevention Staring Fixedly at Risk

■ **We cannot do business if we say “Risk”.**

■ **Safety Index = (1 - Risk Index)**

∴ **Either will do.**

**Sweeping problems under the rug**

■ **Immature Society for disaster prevention or risk management**

**Engineers should not abandon the chance for genuine discussion on disaster prevention by using spurious safety.**

**Repeating Damage**

***KNOWING***

***BUT NOT ACTING !***